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LBOs, MBOs, MBIs and IBOs 
 
 
Abstract: This paper shows that a vibrant and economically important public-to-private market has re-
emerged in the US, UK and Continental Europe, since the second half of the 1990s. The paper shows recent 
trends and investigates the motives for public-to-private and LBO transactions. The reasons for the 
potential sources of shareholder wealth effects during the transaction period are examined: a distinction is 
made between tax benefits, incentive realignment, transaction costs savings, stakeholder expropriation, 
takeover defenses and corporate undervaluation. The paper also attempts to relate these value drivers to the 
post-transaction value and to the duration of the private status. Finally, the paper draws some conclusions 
about whether or not public-to-private transactions are useful devices for corporate restructuring.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
 The public corporation is often believed to have important advantages over its private counterpart. A 
stock market listing allows firms to raise funds in public capital markets, increases the share liquidity for 
investors, allows founders and entrepreneurs to diversify their wealth and facilitates the use of options in 
remuneration packages. Also, the higher degree of visibility and media exposure of public firms can be an 
effective tool in the marketing of the company. On the more personal level, founders and managers of 
public corporations generally enjoy more prestige. However, the publicly quoted company with dispersed 
ownership may suffer from a high degree of managerial discretion resulting from a lack of monitoring 
which may lead to ‘empire building’ at the detriment of shareholder value. One way of refocusing the firm 
on shareholder value is the leveraged buyout (LBO), once known as bootstrapping acquisitions (Gilhully 
(1999)). LBOs grew dramatically in the US and subsequently in the UK during the 1980s. Between 1979 
and 1989, the market capitalization of public-to-private transactions in the US alone was in excess of $250 
billion (Opler and Titman (1993)). This public-to-private trend was not just limited to the smaller public 
companies for instance, in 1989, the LBO-boutique Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts took over and delisted 
RJR Nabisco in a deal valued at $25 billion. Apparently, executives, financiers and investors see the private 
firm as a strong alternative to the public corporation such that some even predicted the “eclipse of the 
public corporation” (Jensen (1989: 61)).  
  Economists investigate the sources of the high premiums that are paid to take a company private. 
While the critics of going-private transactions have continuously emphasized tax advantages and the 
expropriation of non-equity stakeholders as the main sources of wealth gains from going private, systematic 
research on public-to-private transactions does not agree. Other potential sources of wealth gains are 
stronger incentive alignment with a focus on performance and value, the reduction in wasting corporate 




resources, and the improved monitoring capabilities embedded in the governance structure of an LBO. In 
addition, going private eliminates the costs associated with maintaining a stock market listing, but may also 
be motivated by a defensive strategy against hostile takeovers. Finally, going private may simply constitute 
a higher-valued allocation of resources.  
The year 1997 marked the start of a new wave of public-to-private transactions in the US, UK and 
Continental Europe. The strong increase in the number of deals and in average deal value and the fact that 
past LBO research was limited in scope (given the focus on the US and on the 1980s) call for further 
research. To facilitate the development of a new research agenda, this paper documents recent trends, and 
analyses the motives to take public firms private. In addition, this paper examines whether the post-
transaction value creation as well as the duration of private status can be explained by above mentioned 
potential value drivers. Finally, the paper draws some conclusions about whether or not public-to-private 
transactions lead to superior organization forms compared to public firms, or whether going private is a 
shock therapy to restructure firms with a return to public ownership as an inevitable consequence. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly dwells on the different types of leveraged 
buyouts and going-private transactions, and continues by discussing how the two LBO waves came about. 
Section 3 discusses the theoretical considerations underlying the sources of wealth gains from going private 
deals. Section 4 focuses on the four main strands of the literature and on which of the eight motives are 
upheld in each strand. Section 5 lines out a future research agenda. 
 
2. Leveraged buyout waves 
2.1 Definitions 
When a listed company is acquired and subsequently delisted, the transaction is referred to as a 
public-to-private or a going-private transaction.1 Virtually all such transactions are financed by borrowing 
substantially beyond the industry average; hence they are called leveraged buyouts (LBOs). In fact, LBOs 
comprise not only public-to-private transactions but also private firms that are bought out and experience 
an increase in leverage. However, throughout the paper, we use the terms LBO and public-to-private 
transaction interchangeably because, in the empirical US and UK literature, LBOs are usually confined to 
going-private transactions. We will state explicitly when a cited paper refers to the wider definition of 
LBOs.  
                                                 
1 The European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) defines public-to-private transactions as 
follows: ‘a transaction involving an offer for the entire share capital of a listed target company by a new company – 
Newco – and the subsequent re-registration of that listed target company as a private company. The shareholders of 
Newco usually comprise members of the target company’s management and private equity providers. Additional 
financing for the offer is normally provided by other debt providers.’ 




To date, management-led transactions comprise the majority of public-to-private activity. When the 
incumbent management team takes over the firm (frequently backed by private equity investors), the LBO 
is called a management buyout or MBO. When an outside management team acquires the firm and takes it 
private, we refer to this transaction as a management buyin (MBI). The fact that an outside management 
team does not have the same level of private information as the incumbent managers in MBOs, makes 
MBIs a completely different type of deal. An outside management team will generally target firms where 
the incumbent management cannot or does not want to realize the full potential of corporate value, which 
entails that MBIs are more frequently hostile transactions (Robbie and Wright (1995)). When the new 
owners of a delisted firm are solely institutional investors or private equity firms, one tends to refer to these 
transactions as institutional buyouts (IBOs) which are sometimes also called Bought Deals or Finance 
Purchases.2 In some IBOs, the continuing effort of the management team is central to the success of the 
offer, while in other cases the management team is removed. For the typical IBO in which management 
stays on, it is customary to reward managerial performance with equity stakes in the new private firm via 
so-called equity ratchets3 (Wright, Thompson, Chiplin and Robbie (1991)). In terms of equity ownership, 
what separates MBOs from IBOs is whether the management team gained its equity interest through being 
part of the bidding group (in case of an MBO) or as a component of a remuneration package (in case of an 
IBO). As the incumbent management in an IBO does not negotiate on behalf of the bidding group, IBOs do 
not spark the same controversy as MBOs. 4  
As the private equity investors who participated in a public-to-private transaction frequently want 
to exit some time after the firm has been taken private, a secondary initial public offering (SIPO) is 
performed. Such firms that reobtain public status are called reverse LBO (reLBOs).   
 
2.2 International trends and regulatory changes 
 
The LBO evolution in the US 
The US economy of the 1980s was characterized by a large number of (hostile) corporate takeovers 
and restructuring. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) argue that 57% of US quoted firms were takeover targets 
or were restructured between 1982 and 1989. As some mergers failed and substantial excess capacity was 
created, the M&A wave also triggered a substantial increase in LBO and MBO activity. These going 
private transactions facilitated the reduction in excess capacity that ‘complacent corporate America’ was 
                                                 
2 In addition, private equity professionals also tend to distinguish the buyin-management buyout (BIMBO) when the 
bidding group comprises both members of the incumbent management team  as a new team of managers. 
3 This is an incentive device that enables management in a post-buyout firm to increase its equity holdings upon 
meeting specified performance targets.  
4 Schadler and Karns (1990) point out the conflicts of interest of the incumbent managers in an MBO.  




unable to solve itself (Jensen (1991)). Also, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) argue that LBOs enabled the 
deconglomeration of the large corporate groups created in the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, the 1980s 
brought about the financial innovations that enabled the creation of LBOs and MBOs as an organizational 
form to catalyze corporate restructuring. In the first half of the 1980s they performed this role so well, that 
Jensen (1989) even predicted the eclipse of the public corporation. However, the culmination of the LBO 
wave in the latter half of the 1980s was associated with many bankruptcies and evoked fierce public and 
political resistance (Shleifer and Vishny (1991)). The resulting anti-takeover legislation, political pressure 
against high leverage, a credit crunch and a crisis in the high yield bond market made an end to the public-
to-private takeover wave of the 1980s. Although favorable conditions (with the exception of anti-takeover 
measures) were restored in the early 1990s, going-private activity did not take off. Kaplan (1997) and 
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) argued that the 1980-style deals are not necessary anymore, as the focus on 
shareholder value had been institutionalized by corporations since. Only since 1997, a steep rise in US 
going-private activity occurred with a total value of USD 65 billion (1997-2002) although this LBO wave 
does not surpass5 – in value terms – the  peak of the end of the 1980s (see figure 1). The reason for the 
increase at the end of the 1990s results from the fact that small companies experience strong adverse effects 
from their low trading volumes and the threat to be delisted by Nasdaq. More importantly though, the 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on corporate governance seems to increase the costs of a listing 
substantially. The extra burden is a fixed cost that falls disproportionally on the smaller quoted companies 
(Kuhn Capital (2003)). Consequently, this rise in the costs of a stock listing (and the decreasing advantage 
of being public) seems a good reason for small companies to go private.   
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
 
 UK trends 
The phenomenon of public-to-private transactions quickly traversed the Atlantic, with the first UK 
MBO (Haden Maclellan Holdings Plc) being undertaken in 1985. Although smaller in scale, the activity in 
the UK going-private market kept pace with that of the US and the first wave also peaked in 1989. Public 
controversy6 about the increased hostility in going-private transactions that year induced the Takeover 
                                                 
5 A tempering effect on the LBO activity arises from the fact that market conditions for especially IT companies have 
looked dim over recent years, which makes the sale of public equity too costly a source of funds. 
6 Part of the controversy came from two hostile MBIs in 1989, which were among the first acts of hostility in the UK 
public-to-private market. In particular, it was the  629 million Magnet Plc deal, that was unacceptable to investors. 
Institutional investors took the lead in the public protest against the MBO attempt of the Magnet management team, 
which was accused of depriving shareholders of the chance to invest in the long term 




Panel7 to adopt new rules regulating the behavior and procedures in going-private transactions (Wright, 
Thompson, Chiplin and Robbie (1991)). The drop in deals after 1989 made it seem as if the going-private 
transaction had already outlived its short life. As in the US, financial backers were not prepared to take 
risks from 1991 until 1996, which resulted in a dormant public-to-private market. Nevertheless, figure 2 
shows that a new wave of going-private transactions started in 1997. Over the period 1997-2003, 211 
public-to-private deals were completed with a total value of GBP 30 billion.  
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
 
Explanations for the second going-private wave at the end of the 1990s generally emphasize the 
increased confidence of private equity and debt financiers on important issues such as access to key 
information, due diligence, management support, target shareholder support (e.g. through irrevocable 
undertakings) and the expectation that 100% of the shares can be acquired (e.g. through squeeze-out 
provisions) (Ashurst, Morris and Crisp (2002)). Also, innovative techniques such as inducement fees and 
‘hard’ exclusivity agreements have facilitated the reduction of risks in going-private transactions (Davis and 
Day (1998)). However, a much more important reason why especially small firms turned to private equity 
seems to be the disregard for such companies by institutional investors. The consolidation in the fund 
management industry, which has increased institutions’ focus on large, liquid stocks, is frequently 
mentioned as a reason for this institutional disinterest in small companies (Financial Times, Sept. 17, 1999). 
For example, upon going private, Mr. Ainscough, CEO of Wainhomes Plc, said: “We feel unloved and 
unwanted. There has been a lack of investor appetite for small company shares over the last two or three 
years. This made it difficult to fund expansions and acquisitions through the issue of new shares, which is 
one of the main reasons for going public in the first place”(Financial Times, March 4, 1999). The lack of 
liquidity and the need for expansion capital as a consequence of the cut-off of institutional equity finance, 
drove small companies right into the arms of private equity firms to obtain funding (Financial Times, June 
11, 2003). The year 2000 was the year of the largest UK public-to-private deal ever, when MEPC Plc. went 
private through a 3.5 billion IBO. Since then, the activity in the market for public-to-private transactions 
slowed somewhat down, which can partly be explained by the burst of the technology bubble and a general 
decline in share prices, and by worries about the feasibility of exit strategies by means of a secondary initial 
public offering (IPO) in periods of bearish equity markets (Financial Times, June 11, 2003). To date, the 
UK public-to-private activity remains still high with about 30 deals yearly. 
 
                                                 
7 The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (“the Takeover Panel”) is the regulatory body which administers the City Code 
on Takeovers and Mergers (“The Code”). Its primary objective is to ensure equality of treatment and opportunity for 
all shareholders in takeover bids (see www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk). 





 Figure 3 shows how the market for public-to-privates in Continental Europe has evolved over the last 20 
years. Clearly, as in the UK, Continental Europe’s going-private activity in the 1990s was substantially 
stronger compared to the first LBO wave of the late 1980s. Over the period 1997-2003, the total value of 
LBO activity amounts to Euro 28 billion.  
[Insert figure 3 about here] 
Expectedly, both the number of deals and the value of LBO activity of the Continental European market are 
lagging that of the UK for the following reasons. First, the European financial infrastructure to undertake 
public-to-privates is different from that in the UK. The Centre for Management Buyout Research 
(CMBOR, 2002) reports that only few private equity houses  would consider undertaking a potentially risky 
and costly public-to-private transaction in Continental Europe. Second, culture may also play a major role 
in the functioning and sophistication of European financial markets. For example, German managers 
generally try to avoid the ‘hassle associated with a quotation’, while Swiss and Italian companies that do 
obtain a listing are generally too proud of it to even rationally consider going private (CMBOR (2002)). 
Third, some private equity investors have doubts about the possibility of exiting their investments through a 
flotation or a trade sale in bearish markets (CMBOR (2002)). Fourth, the legal and fiscal regulation in 
Europe is traditionally not as favorable to going-private transactions as in the UK. Consequently, there is 
more uncertainty about being able to successfully complete public-to-private transactions. For example, the 
high percentage of tendered shares necessary to take a corporation private is an obstacle in many European 
countries (CMBOR (2002)), while UK private equity investors avidly make use of squeeze out provisions8. 
However, running up to a pan-European merger law, many individual countries have recently implemented 
changes that can provide a stimulus to the public-to-private market. The transparency, shareholder 
protection, takeover rules and development of risk capital as provided for in Italy’s recent Company Law 
reform will allow for more flexibility in structuring private equity deals and provide more reassurance to 
Italian going-private transactions (Ulissi (2000), Lovells (2003)). The Italian government passed new 
legislation in January 2003 allowing bidders to use the target company’s assets to secure their debt (Muller 
and Panunzi (2003)); previously bootstrap acquisitions were illegal in Italy. The new Dutch Fiscal Unity 
law of January 1, 2003, enables acquisition vehicles of private equity investors to allocate the losses of high 
interest payments from acquisition-related leverage to the operations of the target. This makes it more 
attractive to take a company private through an LBO or MBO. The new German Takeover Act provides a 
                                                 
8 Section 429 of the UK Companies Act prescribes that when 90% of the shares to which the takeover relates are 
acquired, the rest can be compulsory acquired. 




set of mandatory9 rules that govern the time schedule of a going-private bid, foresee in an equal treatment 
of all shareholders of the same class, limit prolonged resistance by the target managing board, and 
introduce a squeeze-out rule at 95% of the equity. Also, the German tax reform eliminates the corporate 
capital gains tax on the disposal of shares, which is expected to facilitate the sale of blocks of shares of 
listed firms to private equity investors (Ashurst et al. (2003)). On January 2, 2003, the French minister of 
economy declared that the French usury law10 does not apply to corporate bonds, high yield issues, or debt 
instruments (Fried and Frank (2003)). This has eliminated the need for French borrowers in LBO 
transactions to set up new companies in jurisdictions other than the French. Also, since 2002 the possibility 
of conditional bids for quoted companies have been expanded. Now, bids can also be made conditional on 
clearance decisions from the UK, EU member states and the US (Lovells (2003)). 
 
3. What motivates public-to-private transactions? 
 Essentially, there are several sources of wealth gains that may motivate the going-private decision. These 
are: tax savings, the reduction of agency costs (due to incentive realignment, control concentration or free 
cash flow reasons), wealth transfers from e.g. bondholders or employees to shareholders, transaction costs 
reduction, takeover defenses and corporate undervaluation. In this section, we will detail these motives and 
relate whether these reasons have been sustained in earlier research.  
 
3.1 Tax benefit hypothesis 
 As the vast majority of public-to-private transactions take place with a substantial increase in leverage, 
the increase in interest deductions may constitute an important source of wealth gains. Tax deductibility of 
the interest on the new loans constitutes a major tax shield increasing the pre-transaction (or pre-
recapitalization) value. Clearly, the extent to which tax benefits can play a role in the wealth gains in going-
private transactions depends on the fiscal regime and the marginal tax rates a company is subject to. For the 
period 1980 to 1986, Kaplan (1989b) estimates the tax benefits of US public-to-private transactions to be 
between 21% and 72% of the premium paid to shareholders to take the company private.11 Kaplan (1989b: 
613) adds that ‘a public company arguably could obtain many of the tax benefits without going private’. 
                                                 
9 Before the act was implemented, the adoption of takeover rules by the companies was voluntary rather than 
mandatory. 
10 The French usury law required (prior to January 2, 2003) lenders to disclose the effective global rate of a facility in 
place. This rate reflects the actual cost of borrowing for the borrower. If this rate exceeds the average interest rate on 
investments with similar risk by a third, it is a usurious rate, and a penalty will follow to at least repay the interest paid 
in excess by the borrower (see Lovells (2003)).     
11 These calculations assume that the debt is repaid in 8 years, that the buyout company can generate sufficient taxable 
income, that the marginal tax rate is applied (excluding ESOP tax deductions) and that asset step-ups are effectuated. 
(Other sources that could generate extra taxes for the treasury as result of a leveraged going-private transaction are 
mentioned in Jensen, Kaplan and Stiglin (1989)). 




Lowenstein (1985: 759) is critical to LBOs and calls for a restriction of the tax benefits (the ‘truffles from 
the tax man’), judging that tax-related benefits ‘are so large as to dispense the need to create the other, real 
gains’, a claim supported by Frankfurter and Gunay (1993).  
 
In short, the tax benefit hypothesis states that the wealth gains from going private are largely the result of 
tax benefits associated with the financial structure underlying the transaction. 
 
Still, in spite of the apparent advantages of high leverage in LBOs, it is questionable whether it 
constitutes a true motive to go private. Indeed, in a competitive market for corporate control, the predictable 
and obtainable tax benefits will be appropriated by pre-buyout investors, leaving no tax-related incentives 
for the post-buyout investors to take a company private. 
  
3.2 Agency costs-related hypotheses 
 From the basics of agency theory, three important hypotheses are underlying the motives of public-to-
private transactions, their wealth effect and duration: the incentive realignment hypothesis, the control 
hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis.  
 
 Incentive realignment hypothesis 
More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith (1776) commented on the divergence of interests 
between managers and stockholders in a joint stock company. Berle and Means (1932) describe this 
separation of ownership and control in the typical 20th corporation and express their fears of corporate 
plundering induced by the divergence of interests between managers and shareholders. These insights are 
formalized by Jensen and Meckling (1976). When the manager-entrepreneur of a firm is also the sole 
residual claimant, (s)he extracts pecuniary rents and non-pecuniary12 benefits, with the optimum mix being 
a deliberation of the marginal costs and marginal utility associated with the increase of a type of benefit. 
When the manager sells off a portion of the residual claims to outsiders, the marginal costs of non-
pecuniary benefits decrease as (s)he will bear only a fraction of those costs. Consequently, the manager 
increases his (or her) private benefits (a behavioral pattern called ‘shirking’) which decreases the firm’s 
value. The need to realign incentives of managers with those of shareholders is frequently mentioned as a 
potentially important factor in going-private transactions. For instance, Kaplan (1989a) reports a median 
                                                 
12 These non-pecuniary (also called non-marketable perquisites or private benefits) are not transferable and are 
investor specific. Possible benefits could be the reputation or ‘psychic’ value of being in control (Aghion and Bolton 
(1992), salary, and the value expropriated from shareholders (Dyck and Zingales (2003)). 




increase in equity ownership of 4.41% for the two top officers, and of 9.96% for the other managers in 
MBOs.   
 
The incentive realignment hypothesis states that the wealth gains from going private are largely the result 
of a reunification of ownership and control. 
 
The effects of the incentive realignment hypothesis at higher levels of managerial ownership are 
heavily contested because entrenchment effects are rendering management - even in the wake of poor 
performance - immune to board restructuring and may delay corporate restructuring (Franks, Mayer and 
Renneboog (2001)). LBOs provide an attractive setting to reinvestigate the influence of high managerial 
control.  
It should also be noted that the positive causal relation from managerial ownership to the firm’s 
market value or performance at modest (unentrenched) levels of managerial control, as predicted by the 
incentive realignment hypothesis and widely supported by the (older) literature13, is not undisputed. One of 
the first to argue that the ownership structure of the firm “emerges as an endogenous outcome of 
competitive selection in which various cost advantages and disadvantages are balanced to arrive at an 
equilibrium organization of the firm” was Demsetz (1983:384). He concludes that no relation between 
ownership structure and profitability is expected, directly contradicting Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
predictions. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) provide empirical evidence 
supporting Demsetz’ claims. More recently, studies using more sophisticated econometric techniques (see 
e.g. Himmelberg et al. (1999), Palia (2001)) have also cast doubt on the causality mentioned above.  
It is important to note however, that the incentive realignment hypothesis fails to account for the 
reverse LBOs or secondary IPOs (Palepu (1990) and Kieschnick (1989)). Consequently, the incentive 
realignment theory does not give a complete explanation for the value creation in buyouts.  
  
Control hypothesis  
 Grossman and Hart (1980) describe the free-rider problem on monitoring managerial actions as faced by 
public corporations with a dispersed shareholder structure. The investment in monitoring by one 
shareholder becomes a public good for all shareholders. Consequently, individual shareholders owning 
small equity stakes may underinvest in monitoring activities.  
                                                 
13 Increasing managerial ownership leads to increasing corporate performance or value e.g. Morck, Shleifer and Visny 
(1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). Still, at high levels of managerial ownership, a negative relation is 
observed as the negative effects of managerial entrenchment are dominating.  




Going-private transactions essentially constitute a reunification of ownership and control. After an 
IBO, the post-transaction equity ownership resides in fewer hands and the investors will have stronger 
incentives and more information to actively invest in monitoring management (Maug (1998) and Admati, 
Pleiderer and Zechner(1994)), thereby “protecting their reputation as efficient promoters” (Weston, Chung 
and Siu (1998: 328)). DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984) observe that third party investors often acquire 
a significant stake in the equity of a new, private company and judging from the viability and success of 
buyout specialists, they argue that these third party investors may have a comparative advantage in the 
monitoring task. Irrespective of the identity of the actual equity investors, substantially higher ownership 
concentration implies that the main source of wealth gains from going-privates is a reduction in agency 
costs. This reduction is realized by improved monitoring through increased availability and accuracy of 
information on managerial performance and shareholder activism. 
 
The control hypothesis suggests that the wealth gains from going private are largely the result of increased 
quality of control. 
 
Free cash flow hypothesis 
Jensen (1986: 323) defines free cash flow as “cash flow in excess of that required to fund all 
projects that have positive net present value (NPV) when discounted at a relevant cost of capital”. Using 
empirical results on executive remuneration and corporate performance documented by Murphy (1985), he 
argues that managers have incentives to retain resources and grow the firm beyond its optimal size - the so-
called “empire building” - which is in direct conflict with the interests of the shareholders. This problem is 
most severe in cash generating industries with low growth prospects, as exemplified by the US oil industry 
in the late 1970s. By exchanging debt for equity, managers credibly “bond their promise” to pay out future 
cash flows rather than retaining them to be subsequently invested in negative NPV projects. The risk of 
default attached to the capital restructuring via LBOs serves as a motivating factor to make the firm more 
efficient. Jensen (1986:325) states that “many of the benefits in going-private and leveraged buyout 
transactions seem to be due to the control function of debt”. In the carrot-and-stick theory by Lowenstein 
(1985), the carrot represents the increased managerial share ownership allowing managers to reap more of 
the benefits from their efforts. The stick appears when firms borrow heavily in order to effectuate this 
incentive alignment, which “forces the managers to efficiently run the company to avoid default” (Cotter 
and Peck (2001:102)). 
   




Thus, the free cash flow hypothesis suggests that the wealth gains from going private are largely the result 
of the elimination of free cash flow problems. 
 
However, relying on debt to motivate managers may bring about significant agency costs of debt as debt 
gives managers the incentive to substitute low-risk assets for high-risk assets (the asset-substitution 
problem).  
 
3.3 Wealth transfer hypothesis 
There are three main mechanisms through which a firm can transfer wealth from bondholders to 
stockholders: (i) by an unexpected increase in the risk of investment projects or (ii) via (large increases in) 
dividend payments, or (iii) by an unexpected issue of debt of higher or equal seniority. All these elements 
can effectuate wealth expropriation of specific stakeholders. In a going-private transaction, especially the 
third mechanism can lead to substantial bondholder wealth expropriation.14  
 
The bondholder wealth transfer hypothesis suggests that wealth gains from going private are largely the 
result of the expropriation of pre-transaction bondholders. 
 
   Still, this concept of a systematic reduction in the value of debt may be one-sided in the context of 
LBOs; one needs to balance this argument with the potential favorable effects of other, going-private 
related factors. Firstly, the value of the claims of other types of stakeholders (such as pensioners benefiting 
from corporate pension plans, employees benefiting from stock options, or the fiscal authorities) may 
decline, thus offsetting the negative impact of increases in financial leverage (Marais, Schipper and Smith 
(1989)). Secondly, the incentive effects of high leverage and control concentration in the post-transaction 
firm may have a positive impact on the cash flow stream and consequently lead to more protection of the 
fixed payments to pre-transaction debtholders. Thirdly, a buyout attempt by insiders may convey a 
favorable signal to financial markets about future returns, hereby raising expectations of the capability to 
service debt payments. Fourthly, the pre-transaction securities can be treated in a variety of ways during the 
transaction process: some are redeemed for cash, others converted into other securities or renegotiated. 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
                                                 
14 Allowing systematic risk to vary in a manner consistent with the Black-Scholes-Merton option model framework, 
Weinstein (1983) presents a more formal bond beta model. The sensitivity of bond returns to the capital structure 
confirms the conjectured increase in risk for bondholders in case of an unexpected increase in leverage. This finding is 
empirically confirmed by Masulis (1980), who documents negative bondholder returns in debt-for-equity exchange 
offers. The bondholder wealth transfer hypothesis then dictates that this increases risk, leads to debtholder wealth 
losses and constitutes a wealth transfer to equityholders. 





  In line with the theoretical controversy and measurement problems of going-private losses to the 
bondholders, the empirical research does not provide convincing evidence of wealth expropriation for most 
categories of bondholders (see table 1). Travlos and Cornett (1993) find a statistically significant 
bondholder loss of 1.08%, but this results is based on a sample of only 10 public-to-private transactions. 
Marais al. (1989) do not find negative abnormal bond returns for their sample of US firms that went private 
over 1974-85. What they do find, however, is that going-private transactions are followed by ‘pervasive’ 
debt downgradings by Moody’s, which reflects a systematic increase in perceived default risk. Still, this 
effect is not incorporated in the bond prices. Amihud (1989) and Weinstein (1983) confirm the rating 
downgrades and the lack of bond price effects.  
In contrast, Asquith and Wizman (1990) report significant losses of 1.1% for unprotected corporate 
bonds around the buy-out. Bonds protected by covenant against leverage increases or against reductions in 
net worth through mergers experience abnormal gains. Correspondingly, Cook, Easterwood and Martin 
(1992) find that bondholder losses are sensitive to the presence of restrictive covenants. They find an 
average loss of 3% in 29 MBOs from 1981-89, with a range of returns of –16.9% to 11.5%. Warga and 
Welch (1993) confirm significant bondholder wealth losses for successful LBOs in the 1985-1989 period.  
  These results show that bondholders with covenants offering low protection against corporate 
restructuring lose some percentage of their investment. However, this type of wealth expropriation does not 
necessarily mean that it is a driving factor in the decision to go private, or that it is reflected in the premium 
paid to pre-buyout shareholders. Amihud (1989) explains that the bonds that did suffer losses may not have 
been contractually well protected, and that the wealth transfer therefore does not represent a loss for 
bondholders, but a recuperation of greater protection granted to bondholders than originally contracted for.  
 
Other wealth transfers 
  The empirical literature has paid much less attention to wealth transfers other than those related 
to bondholders. Shleifer and Summers (1988) pose that new investors in hostile takeovers can break the 
implicit contracts between the firm and stakeholders (in particular the employees by reducing employment 
and wages). Nevertheless, Weston et al. (1998) note that such hostility against employees is not observed in 
public-to-private transactions. The only comprehensive study of stakeholder expropriation is Marais et al. 
(1989). Lowenstein (1985) adds tax-related benefits to the list of wealth transfers, arguing that they 
constitute a public subsidy to firms in older, less efficient, capital-intensive industries that engage in going-
private transactions.  
 




The wealth transfer hypothesis suggests that wealth gains from going private are also largely the result of 
the expropriation of pre-transaction stakeholders like employees. 
 
3.4 Transaction costs hypothesis 
  DeAngelo et al. (1984) remark that the costs of maintaining a stock exchange listing are very 
high. From the proxy statements of, for example, Barbara Lynn Stores Inc., they infer that the costs of 
public ownership, registration, listing and other stockholder servicing costs, are about $100,000 per annum. 
Perpetuity-capitalized at a 10% discount rate, this implies a one million dollar value increase from going 
private. Other US estimates of servicing costs mentioned in their paper range from $30,000 to $200,000, 
excluding management time. However, depending on the size of the company, Benoit (1999) reports that 
for UK quoted firms, the fees paid to stockbrokers, registrars, lawyers, merchant bankers and financial PR 
companies, as well as the exchange fee and the auditing, printing and distribution of accounts, can even 
amount to 250,000. Some UK CEOs estimate that these costs may even be higher: Roy Hill, CEO of 
Liberfabrica, just after being bought by a trade buyer in 1999, estimates these costs at 400,000, while 
Jurek Piasecki, CEO of Goldsmiths, 3 months after going private in 1999 put City-associated costs at 
500,000. An even higher estimate comes from the executive chairman of Wainhomes, who, upon the 
announcement of taking the company private, estimated the costs of maintaining a quote at £ 1 million.15   
 
In short, the transaction costs hypothesis suggests that the wealth gains from going private are largely the 
result of the elimination of the costs associated with a listing on the stock exchange.  
 
3.5 Takeover defense hypothesis  
  Lowenstein (1985:743) reports that some corporations have gone private via an MBO “as a final 
defensive measure against a hostile shareholder or tender offer”, an observation which supports the 
theoretical arguments set out by Michel and Shaked (1986). Afraid of losing their jobs when the hostile 
suitor takes control16, management may decide to take the company private.  
Stulz (1988) constructs a model in which pressures from the market for corporate control interact 
with managerial ownership and finds a curvilinear relationship with firm value. The high levels of equity 
ownership of firms where management is entrenched, make it unlikely that these firms are taken over by 
outside parties (see Jensen and Ruback (1983)). However, maintaining this control over the company can 
put management in the predicament of having too much of their personal wealth invested in the firm 
                                                 
15 All UK numbers are quoted in The Financial Times of August 31, 1999. 
16 Franks and Mayer (1996) show that over a period of 2 years subsequent to a takeover in the UK, virtually all board 
members of the target firm left the merged firm. 




(Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg (1999) and Hubbard and Palia (1995)). In an attempt to reduce the 
non-diversifiable risk of this investment, entrenched managers will impose considerable costs on the 
outside shareholders17 (May (1995)).  
 
In short, the takeover defense hypothesis suggests that the wealth gains from going private are the result of 
the management team willing to buy out the other shareholders in order to stay in control. 
 
3.6 Undervaluation hypothesis 
As a firm can be viewed as a portfolio of projects, there may be asymmetric information between 
the management and outsiders about the maximum value that can be realized with the existing assets. It is 
possible that the management, which has superior inside information and knows the true distribution of 
future returns, realizes that the share price is undervalued in relation to the true potential of the firm. 
Lowenstein (1985) argues that when the management is the acquiring party, it may employ specific 
accounting and finance techniques to depress the pre-announcement share price (see also Schadler and 
Karns (1990)). By manipulating dividends, refusing to meet with security analysts or even deliberately 
depressing earnings, managers can use the information asymmetry to their advantage prior to an MBO. 
DeAngelo (1986) finds no evidence of systematic manipulation of pre-buyout accounting data by 
incumbent management. Both Harlow and Howe (1993) and Kaestner and Liu (1996) find that MBOs are 
preceded by significant abnormal buying of company shares by insiders, whereas outsider-induced buyouts 
are not. They interpret this finding as a confirmation that pre-buyout insider trading is associated with 
private managerial information. Alternatively, it is possible that specialized outsiders (like institutions or 
private equity investors) realize that a firm has substantial unrealized lock-up value which incites them to 
buy a toehold stake which may be followed by a management or institutional buy-in. 
 
The undervaluation hypothesis suggests that the wealth gains from going private result from developing an 
alternative higher-valued use for the firm’s assets. 
 
4. Four strands in the empirical public-to-private literature  
 The collective literature on public-to-private transactions and leveraged buyouts can generally be 
classified into four strands, with each strand corresponding to a phase in the buyout process. Figure 4 
                                                 
17 The risk-reducing actions of entrenched managers could result in higher-than-optimal levels of diversification, lower 
leverage and lower riskiness of accepted investment projects (May (1995)). Evidence on the costs imposed by a large 
blockholder can be estimated by assessing the market’s reaction to the sudden drop of a blockholder (Slovin and 
Sushka (1993) and Johnson, Magee, Nagarjan, and Newman (1985)).  




presents this classification and depicts the research methods generally used to study each phase of the 
going-private process. The literature related to the phase of intent describes the characteristics of firms prior 
to their decision to go private and compares these characteristics to those of firms which remain publicly 
quoted. A discriminant analysis or hazard analysis is usually employed to measure the likelihood that a firm 
will go private. A (tender) offer for the shares outstanding terminates the phase of intent. The second strand 
of the empirical literature measures the impact of such an offer and is estimated by analyzing the immediate 
stock price reaction (cumulative abnormal return) or the premium paid to pre-transaction shareholders. 
Once a company is taken private, the literature on the process phase investigates the post-buyout process of 
wealth creation, by means of quantitative or case study methodologies. If, and when, a firm decides to end 
its private status through an exit (e.g. via a secondary initial public offering or SIPO), hazard or duration 
analysis can be performed to examine the longevity of private ownership and its determinants. This 
constitutes the fourth strand of literature, here defined as the duration literature. We examine which of the 8 
hypotheses of section 3 are upheld in each of the 4 strands of the literature. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
4.1 First Strand:  Intent 
 In this section, we provide an overview of the pre-transaction characteristics of firms going private (see 
table 2) and highlight the main motives in LBO and MBO transactions. Maupin, Bidwell and Ortegren 
(1984) examine whether it is possible to separate ex ante those firms that that engage in an MBO  and those 
that remain public. First, their discriminant analysis shows that the 63 formerly listed companies are 
systematically associated with high managerial shareholdings prior to the public-to-private transaction 
(which took place in 1972-83). This is somewhat inconsistent with the incentive realignment hypothesis as 
one would expect that in firms with stronger managerial ownership the agency costs of equity are smaller 
and that there are hence smaller gains from going private). Secondly, formerly quoted firms have a more 
stable cash flow stream than their counterparts that remained public. Thirdly, a systematically lower price-
to-book ratio in the buyout sample suggests that the undervaluation hypothesis may be a prime motivation 
for going private. Finally, a significantly higher dividend yield for the buy-out firms confirms the 
concentration of going-private transactions in mature industries but casts doubt on the free cash flow 
hypothesis.   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
  For a sample of 102 MBOs over the period 1981-85, Kieschnick (1989) finds strong support for 
the undervaluation hypothesis, while the data corroborate neither the free cash flow nor the transaction cost 




hypotheses. Judging that tax benefits could be retrieved by any potential buyer, he discards taxation as a 
factor driving MBOs. In contrast, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) find opposite results for a sample of US going-
private transactions over largely the same period (1980-87)18: they support the free cash flow hypothesis. In 
addition, takeover speculation and the presence of competing bidders are significantly positively related to 
the likelihood of going private. This endorses the takeover defense hypothesis. Furthermore, as outsiders 
are not expected to possess the same level of superior (private) information as insiders, the authors interpret 
this finding as unsupportive of the undervaluation hypothesis.  
Several studies re-examine Lehn and Poulsen’s (1989) dataset while performing a more 
sophisticated analysis. For instance, Kieschnick (1998) documents that, accounting for the influence of the 
Lehn and Poulsen sampling procedure on the control sample, for outliers and for misspecified variables, the 
data fail to support the free cash flow hypothesis. He claims that the potential for tax bill reductions and 
firm size are the significant variables, as is the earlier takeover interest.  
Ippolito and James (1992) observe that there is a significant increase in pension terminations 
following public-to-private transactions. This termination rate more than doubles for the sample firms 
around and after the going-private announcement, relative to firms that remain publicly quoted. Yet, the 
data do not provide sufficient evidence to support the wealth transfer hypothesis as described by Shleifer 
and Summers (1988). Likewise, the results remain inconclusive about the efficiency-improving role of 
going private.  
Opler and Titman (1993) remark that little attention has been paid to the role of financial distress in 
the decision to go private. Using a sample of going-private transactions that spans the 1980s, they find 
strong significant evidence that the costs of potential financial distress deter firms from going private in a 
leveraged transaction. This leads them to conclude that “debt financing is crucial for realizing the gains 
from going private”, while discarding the idea that this is due to the tax benefits of debt usage. The authors 
also find strong support for the free cash flow hypothesis. Weir et al. (2005) investigate whether or not 
those US conclusions are also valid for the UK. They find no evidence that potential financial distress 
deters public-to-private transactions. On the contrary, firms that go private have more assets in 
collateralized form that firms that remain public. The also examine the role of private equity provides and 
state that these investors are more interested in participating in diversified firms with higher growth 
prespects. 
Firms that went private can be classified into two different groups based on pre-transaction 
managerial ownership. Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg (1999) find that firms with low pre-transaction 
                                                 
18 Both studies prefer a maximum-likelihood logit framework as discriminant analysis estimators are not consistent 
when the data do not follow a multivariate normal distribution. 




managerial shareholdings experience more prior takeover interest and exhibit lower leverage than their 
counterparts that remain public. In contrast, firms with high pre-transaction managerial control 
concentration have higher levels of leverage and poorer ex ante stock price performance than the matched 
firms that remain listed. The results show a positive relation between the propensity to go private and the 
managerial shareholdings for firms with higher levels of director ownership, which is inconsistent with the 
incentive realignment hypothesis. For either subgroup, they refute the free cash flow as a determinant for 
going private. In a recent study of 21 reverse LBOs, Kosedag and Lane (2002) find no support for the free 
cash flow hypothesis either. However, the likelihood of going private is positively related to the potential 
for tax savings.  
Finally, Weir, Laing and Wright (2003 and 2004) provide the first systematic UK studies into the 
likelihood of going private. They examine incentive effects, monitoring mechanisms and the role of the 
takeover threat by the market for corporate control for a sample of 95 public-to-private transactions 
completed between 1998 and 2000, and compare these transactions to a control sample created on the basis 
of choice-based sampling for size and industry. They show that the pressure from the market for corporate 
control is not a factor in the decision to go private. Furthermore, no evidence is found supportive of the free 
cash flow hypothesis or accounting underperformance, although the buyout firms do exhibit lower growth 
opportunities. Contrary to US evidence, the potential for tax savings does not seem to play a role in the 
choice to go private. Weir et al. (2004) also document that some specific corporate control variables 
determine the going-private decision; like strong leadership (proxied by the combination the positions of 
CEO and chairman) and concentrated institutional shareholdings. 
To conclude, there is no unambiguous support for any specific hypothesis. Table 2 shows that the 
tax hypothesis is well supported in the US literature. However, the fact that firms with greater tax shields 
are more likely to go private does not necessarily mean that it is an important determinant. The reason is 
that, as it is straightforward to estimate the tax benefits of an LBO, the pre-transaction shareholders are able 
to fully appropriate this tax benefit. It is therefore not a motive for the parties initiating the LBO or MBO. 
Whereas the free cash flow and undervaluation hypotheses are only sporadically supported, the US going-
private decisions in the 1980s frequently are motivated by anti-takeover defense strategies.  
 
4.2 Second Strand:  Impact 
If leveraged and management buyouts are associated with value creation then who is the receiver of 
these benefits? The wealth effects of going-private transactions have been empirically investigated for 
several groups of stakeholders, though the majority of the empirical literature has focused on those of the 




pre-buyout shareholders. The impact of the announcement of a going-private transaction on stockholder 
wealth is either estimated by event studies or by the premium offered.  
 
Shareholder wealth effects and their measurement  
Abnormal returns are calculated to measure the informational effect of an event on the market value 
of a firm. Table 3 present the results of event studies in going-private research. The principal period of 
study has been the 1980s, and virtually all samples cover the US. The typical abnormal return at the 
announcement of an MBO or LBO appears to be around 20% (see table 3), with most of the buyout 
information generally incorporated in the share price from one day before until one day after the event date. 
This 20% abnormal return seems to be rather low compared to the 25%-30% range for tender offers and 
mergers.19 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
An alternative methodology to measure the wealth effect calculates the real premium paid in the 
transaction. Instead of comparing the realized returns to estimated benchmark returns, this methodology 
measures the premium as a difference in the firm value in the beginning and the end of the transaction. In 
the case of LBOs/MBOs this is the difference between the last price traded before the de-listing and the 
pre-announcement price of the firm. This means that the premiums are measured over the full period of the 
going-private transaction. As Table 4 shows, the average premiums vary around 45%.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The two approaches described above lead to different estimates of the shareholder wealth effect 
occurring in the going-private transactions. Several explanations are offered in the literature to account for 
the difference. Firstly, event study returns are corrected for the expected returns, whereas the reported 
average premiums generally are not. However, this difference can hardly explain the deviation of almost 
25%. Secondly, according to DeAngelo et al. (1984) the difference can also be attributed to the fact that 
abnormal returns, as a measure of the market expectation about the future profits from the buyout, include 
the probability that a bid fails, while the premium does not incorporate this probability. They show that an 
offer withdrawal is a realistic threat by estimating the two-day abnormal loss at 8.88% (significant at the 
1% level). Marais et al. (1989) confirm these results. This discrepancy renders the two methods of 
calculating the impact on shareholder wealth incomparable for going-private transactions.  
                                                 
19 For the bid premiums in domestic and cross-border acquisitions in the UK and Continental Europe, see Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004)  





Incentive realignment, free cash flow, tax benefits and transaction costs 
The first systematic study of the cross-sectional variation of shareholder wealth effects in going-
private transactions was performed by DeAngelo et al. (1984). They report that the average cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAARs) around the announcement depends on the managerial equity share prior to the 
public-to-private transaction. In transactions when the pre-buyout management stake is at least 50%, the 
CAARs are 20% higher than in transactions with the management owning less. However, they do not find 
significant difference in the premiums offered to these two groups of companies. This implies a larger 
probability of success for firms with strong initial managerial control (more than 50%). Abnormal returns 
occurring at the announcement of the buyout also depend on the post-transaction ownership of the manager. 
DeAngelo et al. show that the market reaction to the MBO is higher when the management becomes the 
sole owner than when control is shared with a third party. However, such an acquisition of full control by 
the manager is associated with lower offered premiums. 
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) cross-sectionally analyze the average premiums by regressing them 
against a set of explanatory variables that proxy for free cash flows, growth prospects, size and potential tax 
savings. They find that the premiums depend on the level of free cash flows. When partitioning the sample 
based on managerial ownership, the free cash flow variable proves insignificant for higher-than-median 
holdings. This is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis, as the agency costs are higher in the firms 
with low levels of managerial ownership. The potential for tax savings is not a significant determinant in 
the cross-sectional variation of premiums. Kieschnick (1998) revisits the Lehn and Poulsen sample, and 
reaches opposite conclusions after accounting for outliers and redefining the variables. His results are not 
supportive of the free cash flow hypothesis, but sustain that potential tax savings and firm size have a 
positive impact on the wealth gains in LBOs.  
  Travlos and Cornett (1993) jointly test the hypotheses about taxation, bondholder wealth transfers, 
asymmetric information and agency costs in a cross-sectional analysis. In addition, they are the first to test 
the hypothesis of transaction costs savings by employing annual costs of listing according to NYSE and 
AMEX fee schedules (scaled by the market value of equity), but conclude that this hypothesis is not 
upheld. The industry-adjusted Price-Earnings ratio is deemed to be an inverse proxy for agency costs and 
proves to be a statistically significant variable negatively influencing abnormal returns. Consistent with 
DeAngelo et al. (1984), the authors find that the stock price reaction to MBO announcements is 
significantly higher than for third-party transactions (MBIs and IBOs). 
With respect to the effects of managerial ownership, Frankfurter and Gunay (1992) demonstrate 
that the incentive realignment hypothesis is corroborated. The level of insiders’ net divestment is found to 




be a significantly positive determinant of abnormal returns. This confirms that the incentive realignment 
hypothesis does not hold for pre-transaction firms with large managerial ownership. Halpern et al. (1999) 
confirm the latter finding. They cross-sectionally analyze the buyout premiums and reveal a U-shaped 
relation between managerial equity ownership and buyout premium for poorly performing firms. This 
evidence shows that for firms where managers already own a large stake in the company’s equity, the 
reunification of ownership and control is not the prime motive to go private.  
Finally, Kaplan (1989b) argues that tax benefits constitute an important source of wealth gains in 
going-private transactions. His models show that 76% of the total tax shield is paid out as a premium to 
those investors selling out. This supports his claim that predictable potential tax benefits are appropriable 
by pre-transaction investors in a competitive market for corporate control. 
 
Bondholder wealth transfers 
  On the bondholder wealth transfer hypothesis, Marais et al. (1989) report a non-significant 
correlation between pre-buyout debt ratios and abnormal returns. A significant positive relation would have 
confirmed that in firms with high pre-transaction debt ratios, the bondholder wealth transfer could 
contribute to the premiums paid to shareholders to take the firm private. Warga and Welch (1993) show 
that in going private transactions, an increase of one dollar in the firm market value of equity is associated 
with a five cents decrease in the overall value of debt. Likewise, Asquith and Wizman (1990) show that a 
bondholder wealth transfer to the shareholders exists but is small. Their estimate of abnormal losses to 
bondholders is only 3.2% of gains made by shareholders. This evidence confirms that the bondholder 
wealth transfer hypothesis cannot be rejected, but also that bondholder expropriation cannot be a principal 
source of wealth gains to shareholders in public-to-private transactions.   
 
Undervaluation hypothesis 
Harlow and Howe (1993) find that going-private premiums paid by third parties are on average 
11% higher than the premiums paid by management teams, with the typical MBO premium being 39%. The 
correlation of these premiums with various measures of insider trading is only significant for the MBO 
subgroup. This suggests that insider net buying before an MBO conveys favorable information to the 
market and constitutes some support to the undervaluation hypothesis. Kaestner and Liu (1996) reach 
similar conclusions: MBO-related abnormal buying prior to the public-to-private announcement is not 
driven by free cash flows or past tax liabilities but by superior knowledge about the true value of the firm.  
Goh, Gombola, Liu and Chou (2002) investigate analysts’ earnings forecast revisions at the public-
to-private announcement. They report a significant upward revision of earnings forecasts for institutional 




buy-ins, but find that this phenomenon is significantly less pronounced for MBOs. They examine the 
undervaluation hypothesis by analyzing the effect of analysts’ forecast revisions on abnormal returns at the 
announcement of a public-to-private transaction. Whereas they find no significant support for the free cash 
flow hypothesis or any effect induced by a change in leverage, the authors show that the informational 
value of analysts’ forecast earnings has a significantly positive impact on the abnormal returns of the 
public-to-private announcement. As a going-private transaction also induces analysts to increase earnings 
forecasts for rivals, the authors conclude that going-private announcements indeed convey favorable 
information about future earnings. Contrarily, Lee (1992) reports that there are no sustained shareholder 
wealth increases from MBO announcements that are subsequently withdrawn. This result suggests that 
going-private announcements do not convey favorable information on future earnings. 
 
Bidder Competition 
Expectedly, the emergence of multiple bidders augments the premium paid to pre-transaction 
shareholders. For instance, Lowenstein (1985) calculates that the premiums paid to shareholders in MBO 
transactions involving 3 or more competing bidders were on average 19% higher than the premiums paid in 
cases with a single bidder. Amihud (1989) confirms his findings: 9 out of 15 of the largest biggest LBO 
transactions over the period 1983-86 received competing bids and the final premium paid was 52.2% 
compared to 30.7% for cases without bidder competition. Similarly, Easterwood, Singer, Seth and Lang 
(1994) show that the premium in a multiple bidder process is about 17% higher. Interestingly, they as well 
as Lee, Rosenstein, Nangan and Davidson (1992) document that conflicts of interest for bidding 
management teams in MBOs are alleviated by a more independent board. This evidence underlines the 
importance of the Cadbury (1992) recommendation to have a sufficient number of non-executive directors 
included in the board. 
 
UK research  
Renneboog, Simons and Wright (2004) calculate both the cumulative abnormal return and the 
average premium of 177 public-to-private transactions taking place in the UK during 1997-2003. They 
find that the selling pre-buyout shareholders receive a premium of 41% on average and that the 
announcement effect of the going-private deals amounts to 23%. They conclude that neither the post-
transaction tax shield nor the pre-transaction free cash flow has any impact, but that the incentive 
realignment in the post-transaction period is significant determinant. They also show support for the 
transaction costs hypothesis: the savings realized by the direct and indirect costs of listing significantly 
contribute to the shareholder wealth effects from going private.  




Two studies of shareholder wealth effects employing non-US samples focus on divisional buyouts 
and their effects on parent shareholders. Bae and Jo (2002) argue that there are considerable differences 
between divisional and whole firm buyouts. It is expected that divisional buyouts suffer less from the 
absence of arm’s length bargaining, because the parent company management negotiates with the divisional 
buyout team and therefore does not assume the conflict-prone role of managers in MBOs. For a sample of 
65 MBO divestments over the period 1984-89, Briston, Saadouni, Mallin and Coutts (1992) find negative 
returns of -1.79% to parent shareholders (measured over a [-10,10] window and significant at the 1% level). 
Apparently, divisional managers still succeed in negotiating a relatively low price for the assets they buy 
from the parent company. This contradicts the findings of US divisional MBOs (Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990)) in which the parent shareholders do not lose, on average. 
  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
 Table 5 summarizes this second strand of the literature. First, we conclude that the evidence on the 
undervaluation hypothesis is not clear-cut. Second, bondholder wealth transfers seem to exist but are only 
playing a very limited roll in the wealth gains of pre-buyout shareholders. Other wealth transfer (or 
expropriation) hypotheses have not been tested directly. Third, the evidence on agency-related hypothesis, 
more specifically the incentive realignment and free cash flow hypotheses, is mixed. There is evidence that 
the incentive realignment hypothesis is only valid for firms where pre-transaction managers hold small 
equity stakes. Fourth, the increased tax shields from going private are a source of wealth gains that are 
largely captured by the pre-buyout shareholders. Fifth, remarkable is that most of the evidence in this strand 
of the literature – with the exception of a paper on UK divisional buyouts and one on the second public-to-
private wave - comes from the US. This calls for systematic research on this strand from other parts of the 
world.   
 
4.3 Third Strand:  Process 
  So far we have discussed the empirical results of the determinants of the firm-specific probability 
of going private, and how much acquirers generally pay in order to obtain the required proportion of shares 
to delist the company. After these two initial phases, the firm starts a new life away from public scrutiny 
and usually somewhat disappears from the public forum. Fox and Marcus (1992) remark that it is 
imperative that these firms do not vanish from the academic radar. After all, the scientific debate about the 
real role of leveraged going private transactions, being either more efficient organizational forms (Jensen 
(1989)) or simply vehicles to gain tax benefits (e.g. Lowenstein (1985)), cannot possibly be resolved 




without detailed study of the post-transaction performance. After the acquiring party has paid a premium to 
take the company private, the process by which it recovers these out-of-pocket costs and puts the resources 
under its control to a more valuable use, can result in interesting insights into the real sources of wealth 
gains from buyouts. In this section, the most important papers from the large body of empirical work on the 
post-buyout wealth creation process are described. 
 
Post-transaction performance of going-private firms 
Kaplan (1989a) analyzes the post-transaction operating performance of 48 MBOs that took place 
during 1980-86. He finds that industry-adjusted operating income does not increase during the first two 
years subsequent to the buyout, but grows by 24.1% in the third year. When one controls these findings for 
divestitures, the bought-out firms even strongly outperform their public counterparts in every post-buyout 
year. Kaplan also documents that industry-adjusted capital expenditures fall significantly after the buyout, 
which is in line with the curbing of management’s ‘empire-building tendencies’ provided that pre-buyout 
firms had large levels of free cash flows. However, in bought-out firms that do not generate high free cash 
flow, restricting capital expenditures may signal an underinvestment problem induced by the debt burden. 
Both Smith (1990) and Kaplan (1989a) show evidence that the post-buyout operating performance (median 
operating cash flow per employee and per dollar of asset value) increases more than the industry median 
from the prior before for two years after the transaction. Tighter working capital management seems to be a 
small contributing factor, while a reduction of spending on discretionary items or capital expenditures 
cannot explain the improved operating performance.  
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) perform a similar exercise for reverse LBOs both on the whole 
firm and on the divisional level. Restructuring activities explain the strong improvements in efficiency after 
an MBO. They argue that the premium is more likely to capture the efficiency improvements in divisional 
buyouts than in whole-firm buyouts. The reason is that there is less asymmetric information in relation to a 
divisional MBO than in a whole-firm going-private transaction because in the former case the negotiation 
management teams are both insiders. Efficiency gains reflect real operating gains; the accounting variables 
show that these improvements result mostly from cost cutting, and not from the generation of more 
revenues. Divisional buyouts indeed appear to have more pronounced efficiency gains, which implies more 
support for the undervaluation hypothesis for whole-firm MBOs. In contrast, neither Kaplan (1989a) nor 
Smith (1990) supports the undervaluation hypothesis. The former study observes that pre-MBO financial 
projections, upon which the offer price will be based, systematically overstate the future realizations. Smith 
(1990) observes that cash flows tend not to increase after a failed buyout proposal. Post-buyout cash-




generative characteristics of defensive and non-defensive transactions do not differ, which undermines the 
undervaluation hypothesis that MBOs are motivated by private information held by management.  
 
The post-transaction situation for employees 
The three papers discussed above also elaborate on the effects of a public-to-private transaction on 
the firm’s employees. When controlling for reduced employment resulting from post-transaction 
divestitures, Kaplan (1989a) reports that median employment actually rises by 0.9%. Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990) report that going-private transactions do not cause layoffs. These results are confirmed 
by Smith (1990) who also notes that the number of employees from the year before until the year after the 
MBO grows more slowly than the industry average. In another interesting study, Lichtenberg and Siegel 
(1990) investigate the consequences of MBOs on total factor productivity, by employing a sample of a 
thousand plants. Their main conclusion is that total factor productivity growth on the plant level increased 
by 8.3% above the industry mean over the three years following a going-private transaction. Also, MBOs 
experience higher mean productivity increases, while productivity increases for the fourth and fifth year 
after the deal are non-significant. Finally, the study documents that employment and compensation for 
blue-collar workers do not decline after a buyout, while white-collar workers do experience compensation 
and employment losses.  
  
Organization and strategy in the post-transaction firm 
Liebeskind, Wiersema and Hansen (1992) investigate the incentive realignment hypothesis by 
testing if and how corporate restructuring affects the firm and its post-transaction strategy. Using a sample 
of 33 of the largest LBOs (1980-84), and a matched control sample of companies that remain public, they 
find that managers of going-private firms resorted to more downsizing of their businesses and to expanding 
production lines less. However, the business mix of the corporate portfolios does not change. Apparently, 
the incentive realignment following the buyout induces managers to pursue a focus strategy and to forego 
excess growth.  
Jones (1992) focuses on the use of accounting control systems in the new firm after going private. 
He finds that an improvement in operational efficiency was achieved through modifications of the 
organizational structure. Going private led to improved planning techniques that match the organizational 
context better. Zahra (1995) uses interview data to uncover the role of entrepreneurship in performance 
improvements in the post-buyout process. He confirms that, even with a high debt burden, innovation and 
risk taking is not stifled. Post-buyout performance improvements arise from an increased emphasis on 
commercialization and R&D alliances, as well as from an improved quality of the R&D function and 




intensified venturing activities. Zahra (1995) claims that incentive realignment explains most of the 
performance improvement.   
 
The evolution of post-buyout performance 
  Kaplan and Stein (1993) add an important nuance to the positive view sketched in the Kaplan 
(1989a) and Smith (1990) papers. They point out that US public-to-private transactions effectuated in the 
latter half of the decade were pricier and riskier, eroding the returns of taking a company private. Long and 
Ravenscraft (1993) confirm that the performance gains for LBOs and MBOs completed in the latter half of 
the 1980s decline, but performance and efficiency improvements remain substantial. For instance, Opler 
(1992) calculate that for the 20 largest transactions in the 1985-90 period, operating profits per dollar of 
sales rise by 11.6% on an industry-corrected basis. Per employee, this increase is even as high as 40.3%. In 
addition, leveraged going-private transactions do not seem to decrease spending on R&D.  
 
The pre-buyout benchmark 
  So far, the results for post-transaction firms have all seemed to improve. However, Smart and 
Waldfogel (1994) and Palepu (1990) claim that earlier work mistakenly compares post-transaction 
performance to pre-transaction performance, arguing that it should really be compared to pre-transaction 
expected performance to ascertain whether performance improvements are attributable to LBOs. One could 
argue that these performance improvements would have happened anyway, and that the buyout is merely 
the result of undervaluation. Even after taking into account this different benchmark, Smart and Waldfogel 
(1994) still show strong operating performance improvements for going-private firms for the Kaplan 
(1989a) sample.  
 
Case study results 
Both Baker and Wruck (1989) and Yin (1989) use case studies to explore the organizational links 
between going private and performance improvements. Investigating the MBO at O.M. Scott & Sons 
Company, the former authors confirm the results of large sample studies that high leverage and managerial 
equity ownership lead to improved incentives and, subsequently, to improved performance. Of equal 
importance in terms of their contribution to performance however, are the restrictions imposed by debt 
covenants, the emphasis on managerial compensation (and its incentives), decentralization of decision 
making, and the relation Scott managers had with the third-party buyout team of Clayton & Dubilier 
partners. Baker and Wruck (1989) conclude that the performance improvements were related to some 
specific organizational characteristics of leveraged buyouts, and not just because these improvements were 




not made before when the firm was still in public hands. Denis (1994) provides evidence that looks at least 
as convincing by comparing a leveraged recapitalization (Kroger Co.) with an LBO (Safeway Stores Inc.). 
He finds that, although both firms dramatically increase leverage, the improved managerial equity 
ownership, boardroom change, monitoring by an LBO specialist firm, and executive compensation 
associated with the LBO are responsible for the more productive cash generation in Safeway Stores. Still, 
Denis acknowledges that the leveraged recapitalization did generate performance improvements. This paper 
suggests an LBO is not only about leveraging up the businesses; it is a completely different organizational 
form with its own value improving characteristics. This implies that not all, but part of the gains from going 
private can be attributed to the new organizational form of an LBO.  
Behavioral issues like the social and political consequences of changes in ownership on the 
motivation of managers are examined by Green (1992) in 8 case studies of UK divisional MBOs. Although 
managers seem to work harder and are more entrepreneurial in the investigated MBOs, the prospect of 
financial rewards did not appear to be the main motivator. Rather, contrary to beliefs commonly held by 
financial economists, it was the changed working conditions that allowed them to do their work more 
effectively. In fact, this finding casts doubt on the incentive realignment hypothesis, as it means that 
innovativeness drives ownership concentration, rather than the other way around. Indeed, Bruining and 
Wright (2002) find that management buyouts of non-listed firms occur mostly in firms where 
entrepreneurial opportunities exist. Clearly, these case studies conform the claim that MBOs are more than 
just a vehicle to improve efficiency in a mature-sector company (Wright, Hoskissen, Busenitz and Dial 
(2000)).  
  Specifically for management buyins of unquoted UK firms, Robbie and Wright (1995) find that 
all too often, MBI teams cannot adequately deal with problems that occur post-transaction. Such problems 
were not anticipated in the due diligence examination but substantially impede the execution of a new 
strategy. The evidence that there is a lack of accurate information turns out to be a major cause of problems 
in third-party transactions. The paper supports the incentive realignment and monitoring hypotheses. 
 
Reverse LBOs 
A substantial body of literature has focused on the phenomenon of reverse LBOs. DeGeorge and 
Zeckhauser (1993) model that asymmetric information, debt overhang and behavioral problems can create a 
pattern of superior performance before the reverse LBO (the private stage), and disappointing results 
afterwards (the public stage). Their empirical study of 21 reverse LBOs between 1983 and 1987 confirms 
their hypothesis. Holthausen and Larcker (1996) expand this study by analyzing the value drivers of the 
accounting performance for 90 reverse LBOs (1983-88). They find that, although leverage and insider 




equity ownership are reduced in reverse LBOs, both remain high relative to the industry-adjusted numbers 
of quoted firms. Thus, they argue that reverse LBOs are in fact hybrid organizations because they retain 
some of the characteristics of an LBO after flotation. Their regression analysis strongly upholds the 
incentive realignment hypothesis. For at least four years after a secondary IPO, these firms outperform their 
industries on an accounting basis performance but experience a performance decline afterwards (which 
Bruton, Keels and Scifres (2002) confirm). Holthausen and Larcker (1996) speculate on the causes for this 
lagged effect of performance reduction: they believe that reverse LBOs gradually lose their typical LBO 
characteristics and evolve towards the typical firm of the industry. They also find that capital expenditures 
increase and R&D expenditures decrease after the IPO, but that reverse LBO firms seem to be more 
efficient with respect to working capital requirements. Like DeGeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) and Mian 
and Rosenfeld (1993), they do not find stock price underperformance, until at least four years after 
flotation. Apparently, reverse LBOs are rationally priced and do not suffer from long-term 
underperformance (Ritter (1991)). Fox and Marcus (1992) argue that the reverse LBO performance studies 
cannot to be used to make inferences about going private in general, as the studies use biased samples of 
the whole LBO population. Wright, Thompson, Robbie and Wong (1995)) agree with this criticism as those 
companies returning into public hands are likely to be the strongest performers.  
 
Financial distress 
  Although there are case studies on individual going-private firms in trouble (see e.g. Bruner and 
Eades (1992) and Wruck (1991)) as well as some large sample studies (e.g. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) and 
Easterwood (1998)), research directly testing the effects of recessionary conditions is scarce. Nevertheless, 
Wright, Wilson, Robbie and Ennew (1996) find that the probability of failure of buyouts and buyins of 
unquoted companies is reduced due to the existence of managerial incentive plans and well-timed corporate 
restructuring. Consistent with Brunner and Eades (1992), they find that excessive leverage is a strong 
predictor for failure when macro-economic conditions turn sour. Denis and Denis (1995) confirm that, for a 
sample of 29 leveraged recapitalizations completed between 1985 and 1988, regulatory developments as 
well as a recession (or industry-wide downturns) strongly negatively influence the survival probability.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
  Table 6 summarizes the main results discussed in this section. We conclude that the empirical 
research has confirmed that the post-transaction performance improvements are in line with those 
anticipated at the announcement of a going-private transaction. The causes of the performance and 
efficiency improvements are primarily the organizational structure of the leveraged buyout (characterized 




by high leverage and strong (managerial) ownership concentration). Almost unambiguously, the studies in 
this strand of the literature support the role of incentive realignment in the post-buyout value creating 
processes, while the employee wealth transfer hypothesis seems unanimously discarded. While the 
undervaluation hypothesis remains disputed, the free cash flow theory appears to find more support in this 
strand than in others. Nevertheless, the empirical work on post-buyout processes seems far from complete, 
and will require more studies of long-run performance.  
 
4.4 Fourth strand:  Duration 
Jensen (1989) argues that LBO firms constitute a superior organizational form to publicly held 
firms, due to the better incentives they offer to managers and monitors. Management incentives relating pay 
to performance, decentralization of control, high leverage and other binding agreements, combined with 
reputational concerns of the LBO sponsors, reduce the agency cost problems inherent to the structure of the 
public corporation in low-growth industries. Rappaport (1990) contests Jensen’s (1989) proclaimed 
superiority of the LBO organization to public corporations, arguing that the latter are ‘vibrant, dynamic 
institutions - capable of long periods of underperformance, to be sure, but also fully capable of self-
correction’. In short, Kaplan (1991) refers to Rappaport’s (1990) view of ‘going-private as a shock 
therapy’. After the necessary changes have been brought about under highly-leveraged private ownership, 
the costs of inflexibility, illiquidity and the need of risk diversification will exceed the benefits of the LBO 
as organizational form, with a return to public ownership as an inevitable consequence. Clearly, in this 
view, the time horizon associated with the role allocated to going private will generally be shorter than the 
‘significant period of time’ Jensen (1989) deems necessary. Kaplan (1991) highlights the importance of 
evidence on LBO-duration in the discussion on the role of public-to-private transactions, the reasons why 
they occur and the sources of wealth gains that motivate going-private transactions. Therefore, this section 




The empirically correct way to verify the conjectured duration of leveraged buyouts should inhibit 
an analysis of the conditional probability of reversion to public ownership. Kaplan (1991) was the first to 
formally address the issue and finds that companies that return to public ownership do so after a median 
time in private status of only 2.63 years. For his sample of 183 large going-private transactions from 1979-
86, he finds an unconditional median life of 6.82 years for whole-firm and divisional LBOs.  




Using hazard functions, Kaplan (1991) observes constant duration dependence in years 2 through 5, 
and negative duration dependence20 beyond this. This means that the likelihood of returning to public 
ownership is largest in years 2 to 5, while this likelihood decreases as time under private ownership 
increases beyond this period. This result leaves room for both the existence of Rappaport’s (1990) 
arguments about the shock therapy of LBOs, as well as for Jensen’s (1989) idea that firms that go private 
will remain private for longer periods of time due to the advantages of incentive realignment. Consistent 
with Kaplan (1991), Holthausen and Larcker (1996) confirm that LBOs reversing to public ownership 
retain some of the characteristics they exhibited under private ownership.  
  Van de Gucht and Moore (1998) also explore the longevity of LBOs, but do not unambiguously 
support Kaplan’s (1991) results. Using a sample of 343 whole-firm and divisional buyouts from 1980-92, 
they confirm the results found by Kaplan (1991 and 1993) on the median conditional and unconditional 
duration of the private status. However, employing a split population hazard model that does not implicitly 
assume that all firms that went private eventually return to public ownership (as Kaplan (1991) does), they 
document a positive duration dependence until the seventh year, and negative dependence beyond that year. 
Divisional buyouts are found not to be significantly different from whole-firm going-private transactions in 
terms of their duration. Interestingly, the climate of the financial markets significantly influences the 
reversion moment.  
  
UK evidence 
  Wright et al. (1995) investigate the duration that buyouts and buyins stay private for a sample of 
182 UK firms for 1983-86. This sample includes public-to-private transactions as well as buyouts of non-
quoted firms, and both divisional and whole-firm buyouts and buyins. This study shows that – in line with 
the US findings - the hazard coefficient increases strongly from approximately 3 to 6 years after the buyout, 
after which a negative duration dependence persists. Survivor analysis estimations show that size is a 
significantly negative determinant of longevity in buyouts.  
  Quantitative analysis is combined with three case studies in Wright, Robbie, Thompson and 
Starkey (1994) in order to investigate the influence of a whole array of management applications on the 
duration of a firm’s private status. Their evidence suggests that ownership, financial and market-related 
factors are the prime factors explaining the duration of the buy-out. Third party financing institutions are 
associated with the propensity to exit fairly rapidly after a transaction, as these institutions desire a return 
within a pre-established time frame. If the management of the buy-out firm owns a relatively small fraction 
                                                 
20 Duration dependence is extent to which the conditional hazard of the event of interest occurring is increasing or 
decreasing over time (for a general review see Kiefer (1988) or Heckman and Singer (1984)). 




of the equity, it will be not able to extend the private status of the firm for long. Finally, the study 
documents that environmental dynamism and competitive pressure are important determinants of buyout 
longevity.  
Support for the contradicting claims of both Rappaport (1990) and Jensen (1989) (an LBO is 
needed for a short time period as a shock therapy versus an LBO is an efficient organizational form even in 
the long run) is given by Halpern et al. (1999). The probability of remaining private is positively related to 
managerial shareholdings. A subsample of LBOs remains private only for a short time; these were usually – 
prior to the buyout - poorly performing firms with low managerial equity holdings. After restructuring the 
operations subsequent to the buyout, these firms regain a stock exchange quotation. Another subsample 
(firms with ex ante high managerial shareholdings) seems to consider that the private status is the efficient 
form of organization and remain delisted.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
 Table 7 gives an overview of the main results of the papers discussed in this section and shows that 
there is a dichotomy among the firms that go private. Some firms seem to use the organizational form of a 
going-private transaction as a temporary shock therapy efficiently allowing corporate restructuring, while 
for others it constitutes a sustainable superior organizational form. The decision to organize a reverse LBO 




On the whole, there has been little systematic research into the sources of wealth gains of this 
second wave of going-private transactions. Therefore, it is difficult to make objective statements on the 
efficiency and economic value of leveraged buyouts as change catalysts. Furthermore, most of what is 
currently known about going-private transactions has been empirically verified with US samples of the 
1980s. It is unclear whether this US evidence on the sources of wealth gains from going private is 
generalizable to US LBOs of the 1990s. Furthermore, it is even more questionable whether the US findings 
can be extrapolated to the UK and Continental European waves of public-to-private transactions, 
considering the differences in corporate performance regulation.  
Apart from the fact that results from the 1980s may no longer apply to the present situation, there 
are more compelling reasons why the lessons drawn from US LBO research cannot entirely be extrapolated 
to UK and Continental European public-to-private transactions. First, the nature and extent of debt 
financing in US public-to-private transactions differ substantially from those of UK/European deals (Toms 




and Wright (2004)). Whereas US deals of the 1980s were primarily financed with junk bonds, mezzanine 
was and still is the standard in the UK and Continental Europe.21 Since these two sources of funds have 
different characteristics (in terms of flexibility, interest rates, maturity, covenants and gearing levels), it is 
not unlikely that the financing choice will influence the incentive mechanisms in all phases of a going-
private transaction. Also, the debt levels associated with UK transactions are generally lower than the 
gearing ratio in US deals.  Second, tax motives have been proven to be an important source of wealth gains 
in US transactions in the 1980s. However, taxes cannot play such a large role under UK tax law, as 
dividends are untaxed. Third, in the US market for corporate control far more hostile approaches prevail. 
The UK going-private wave of the late 1990s exhibits a hostility rate of merely 7.3% (Renneboog, Simons 
and Wright (2004)). This discrepancy undoubtedly affects the bidding process for firms going private, and 
illustrates that the takeover defense hypothesis may logically not be expected to play as big a role in UK 
and Continental European deals. Fourth, venture capital and buyout markets in the UK have traditionally 
been more closely linked than those in the US. Thus, the UK going-private activity has focused on growth 
opportunities, whereas US LBOs have occurred more frequently in mature, cash-rich industries. Finally, the 
UK and Continental European markets for corporate control are organized and regulated completely 
differently than the US ones. Whereas US state regulation has effectively been able to stringently regulate 
unsolicited takeover activity, the UK system has preferred self-regulation, hereby favouring the unrestricted 
functioning of market forces (Miller (2000: 534)).22  
These differences in corporate governance regulation will influence the sources of wealth creation 
through going-private transactions. Moreover, the subtle idiosyncrasies in financial practices and culture on 
either side of the Atlantic further reduce the generalizability of US-based results to the UK/Continental 
European situation. This implies that there is a strong need for systematic further multi-country research 
into the second leveraged buyout wave. First, future research should be directed towards analyses of the 
type of company that goes private. Second, future research should estimate and analyze the shareholder and 
bondholder wealth effects of public-to-private transactions and investigate why (if at all) these wealth 
effects differ by corporate governance regime. Third, the process of realization of wealth creation once the 
firm has been taken private should also attract research interest as little is known about that LBO stage. 
Finally, future research should address the duration and its determinants of the private status of formerly 
public firms. Special attention could then be given to international comparisons and the role of going 
private as a corporate restructuring device in a multi-country setting.   
                                                 
21 Although recently a limited number of transactions in the UK have been financed with junk bonds. 
22 For an overview of the developments of European takeover regulation: see McCahery and Renneboog (2004) and 
Goergen, Martynova and Renneboog (2005). 
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Figure 1: US public-to-private activity 
 
This figure shows the number of public-to-private transactions (left hand scale) and the value in 
million USD (right hand scale). Source: Centre for Management Buyout Research / Barclays 












































Figure 2: UK public-to-private activity 
 
This figure shows the number of public-to-private transactions (left hand scale) and the value in 
million GBP (right hand scale). Source: Centre for Management Buyout Research / Barclays 


























Figure 3: Continental European public-to-private activity 
 
This figure shows the number of public-to-private transactions (left hand scale) and the value in 
million Euro (right hand scale). Source: Centre for Management Buyout Research / Barclays 















































Figure 4: The theoretical framework on the public-to-private literature  
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Table 1: The bondholder wealth effects in public-to-private transactions 
This table shows the estimated bondholder losses of the total public debt. Losses are calculated using an event study 
methodology. The benchmark returns used in the market models is specified. N is the number of different bonds that 
were used in the analysis, although some were issued by the same company. *** ,**, * s stand for significance at the 1, 5 


























       





33 ALL [-69,0] 
days 
0.00% Dow Jones Bond index 
 




199 ALL [0,1] 
month 
-1.1%** Shearson-Lehman-Hutton bond index 
 
Cook, Easterwood 




62 MBO [0,1] 
month 
-2.56%** Shearson-Lehman-Hutton bond index 
 















CRSP equally weighted index. 
 





36 ALL [-2,2] 
months 
-5.00%** Rating and maturity weighted Lehman 
Bond Index 
 




Table 2: Summary of previous empirical results for the first strand of literature: Intent 
This table shows the studies that refer to strand 1 of public-to-private research. Yes = supportive, No = unsupportive, Inconcl. = inconclusive.  















































































- - Yes - - Yes No 
Kieschnick (1989) 1980-87 
US 
263 MBO Logistic 
regressions 
 
No - - No - No - Yes 
Kieschnick (1998) 1980-87 
US 
263 ALL Logistic 
regressions 
 
Yes - - No - - Yes No 





169 ALL Logistic 
regressions 
- - - Inconcl Inconcl - - - 





180 ALL Logistic 
regressions 
No - - Yes - - - - 
Halpern, Kieschnick 
and Rotenberg (1999) 
1981-85 
US 
126 ALL Multinomial 
Logistic regr. 
 
Yes No - No - - Yes - 





21 ALL Logistic 
regressions 
Yes - - No - - - - 




95 ALL Logistic 
regressions 
No Yes Yes No - - No - 




99 ALL Logistic 
regressions 
- No - No - - No - 
Weir, Laing, Wright 
and Burrows (2003) 
1998-01 
UK 
117 ALL Logistic 
regressions 
- Inconcl. No No - - - - 
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This table shows all papers that estimate the shareholder wealth effects using event study analysis.  
***, **, * stand for statistical significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
ALL = all going private deals. MBO = MBO deals only 
 
Study Sample eriod/ 
country  
Type  of 
Deal 
Event window Obs.  CAAR 
 





















Torabzadeh and Bertin (1987) 1982-85 
US 








Lehn and Poulsen (1989) 1980-87 
US 







Amihud (1989) 1983-86 
US 
 
MBO -20,0 days 15 19.60%*** 
 
Kaplan (1989a) 1980-85 
US 
 
MBO -40,60 days 76 26.00%*** 
 











Slovin, Sushka and Bendeck (1991) 1980-88 
US 
 











MBO -1,0 days 






Frankfurter and Gunay (1992) 1979-84 
US 







Travlos and Cornett (1993) 1975-83 
US 





























































This table shows all papers that estimate the shareholder wealth effects of going private through premiums 
analysis. The results are not independent due to partially overlapping samples.  
***, **, * stand for statistical significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
ALL = all going private deals. MBO = MBO deals only 

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MBO 30 days 28 56.0% 
Lehn and Poulsen (1989) 1980-87 
US 
 







MBO 20 days 15 42.9% 





MBO 2 months 76 42.3% 
 




ALL 1 day 47 
 
37.9% 




ALL 20 days 121 44.9% 
Travlos and Cornett (1993) 1975-83 
US 
 
ALL 1 month 56 
 
41.9% 





MBO 20 days 184 32.9% 
 





ALL 1 month 95 44.9% 














Table 5: Summary of the second strand of the literature: Impact 
This table shows the most important papers that deal with strand 2 of public-to-private research. Yes = supportive, No = unsupportive, Inconcl. = inconclusive. All estimated 
shareholder wealth effects from Table 3 and 4 are reproduced here. ***, **, * stand for statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
ALL = all going private deals,  MBO = MBO deals only, FCF = Free Cash Flow hypothesis, Bidder Comp. = Bidder competition. 
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Table 5 continuted 
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121 ALL - - 20 days 44.9% - - - - - - - Yes - 
Easterwood, Singer, 
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- - - - - - - - Yes 





126 ALL - - - Not 
mentioned 
No No - No - - - - Yes 











- - - - - - - - - Yes - 




















Table 6: Summary of the third strand of literature: Process 
This table shows the most important papers that deal with strand 3 of the public-to-private research. Yes = supportive, No = unsupportive, Inconcl. = inconclusive. Type of 


































Kaplan (1989a) 1980-85 
US 
76 MBO - Yes - - No - - No 





1 case MBO - Yes Yes Yes No - - No 
Smith (1990) 1977-86 
US 






151 MBO - Yes Yes - No - - Yes 





244 ALL - - Yes - No - - - 
Jones (1992) 1984-85 
US 
 
17 MBO - Yes - - - - - - 
Opler (1992) 1985-89 
US 
 
45 ALL Yes Yes - - - - - Inconcl. 
Liebeskind, Wiersema 
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Zahra (1995) 1992 
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47 ALL - Yes - - - - - - 
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39 ALL - Yes - - - - - - 
 




Table 7: Summary of previous empirical results for the fourth strand of literature: Duration 


























After year 5, the conditional probability of returning to public ownership decreases. 





ALL 343 Until year 7, the conditional probability of returning to public markets increases, while after seven 
years, it decreases. The timing of reversion is influenced by the financial markets’ climate. 
Wright, Robbie, 














ALL 140 The conditional probability of reversion increases strongly between year 3 and year 6, and 
subsequently decreases.  
Halpern, Kieschnick 




ALL 126 Longevity of the private status is increasing in managerial equity stake. 
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